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Since 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which deals with frivolous litigation papers, has
prompted much controversy, satellite litigation, and a new
cottage industry. Rule amendments in 1983 increased both the
range of sanctionable attorney conduct and the extent of
judicial sanctioning authority. By the latter 1980s, many had
concluded that further amendments were warranted. Recent
case law, commentary and empirical research have culminated
in a proposed new rule forwarded by the U.S. Supreme Court
to Congress in April 1993 and scheduled to take effect in
December 1993. In part, the 1993 rule reduces a party's
incentives to pursue sanctions for frivolous papers since less
misconduct will be sanctionable. Further, attorneys' fees will be
less available as a sanction even when a violation occurs.
Increasingly, other forms of sanctions, such as fines payable to
the court, will be employed; these new forms raise very
different questions than do the most common form of reported
sanction under the 1983 rule-an award of attorneys' fees.
Although both fines and fees constitute monetary sanctions,
fines are usually ordered with the public interest in mind while
fees are awarded, at least in significant part, to promote
private interests. The move from fees to fines presents new
challenges for those concerned with Rule 11. This Article will
review fines under the 1993 rule, finding that the new rule
may best be characterized as a "Big-Brother-Says-Stop-and-
Think-Again" rule-quite distinct from the "Stop-and-Think"
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rule of 1983.
II. THE HISTORY OF RuLE 11 SANCTIONS
A. Changes in Sanctionable Conduct and Sanctioning
Authority in the 1980s and 1990s
Pursuant to the August 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the signature of an attor-
ney on a litigation paper constitutes a certification by the attor-
ney that "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry," the paper is "well grounded
in fact."' If an attorney violates this standard, under the rule
the trial court shall impose "an appropriate sanction."2 Such a
1. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 (underlined), together with the deleted
portions of the earlier (1938) rule (lined through), are as follows. They appear,
together with the final Advisory Committee Notes, in Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 166, 196-201 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amend-
ments].
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individ-
ual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state
his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stat-
ute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule
in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome
by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corrobo-
rating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or
other paper that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good greand to su part it, and that it it- net interposed for delay
formed after reasonable incuiry it is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. er-is
signed with intcnit te defeAM the purpese of this rule; it may be strieken
As haian d faloc ad Qh aetion may pr-.d as th ..gh the peaziag
haed nt been Bzzrl-wd. Per A wiful vielation ef thisnalc an attorney may
be sulajeeted to apprepiate diseiplinary actfien. S-imilarf acticn may be
tiAkefn if: Sand-alcus of i-ndcze-nt matter is inserted. If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2. Id. at 197.
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sanction is most often imposed on the attorney,' and usually
requires a monetary payment to help defray the opposing
party's legal expenses. This sanction cannot be charged to the
client.4
The 1983 amendments were intended to alter attorney
conduct in order to "streamline the litigation process by lessen-
ing frivolous claims or defenses."5 The changes were designed
to make attorneys more responsible for shielding the federal
courts from frivolous papers. While the 1983 rule requires
attorneys to certify that papers are "well grounded in fact,"6
the former rule, effective in 1938, required only certification as
to "good ground."7 The 1983 amendments were thus intended
to make the certification standard for attorneys "more strin-
gent" and to create an expectation "that a greater range of
circumstances will trigger" violations of the signature rule.8
The 1983 rule also expressly requires attorneys to under-
take "some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law,"9
while the 1938 rule contained no such explicit requirement."
This addition of a prefiling duty led many to characterize the
1983 rule as a "Stop-and-Think" rule.1"
3. While the rule provides that a violation of the signature requirement may
result in sanctions against "the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both," id., the federal courts are not disposed toward sanctioning a client for mis-
conduct solely the responsibility of some attorney. See Cine Forty-Second St.
Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1069 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("It would be with the greatest reluctance, however, that I
would visit upon the client the sins of counsel, absent client's knowledge, condo-
nation, compliance, or causation.").
4. See, e.g., Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 142,
145 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (finding client financial responsibility "untenable").
5. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 198 (Advisory Committee Note to
1983 Rule 11).
6. Id at 197.
7. Id,
8. Id. at 198-99 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11).
9. Id. at 198 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11).
10. Id. at 197. While the phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry" was only
added to Rule 11 in 1983, a few cases read a duty of inquiry into the former rule.
See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (D.N.J. 1983); Kinee v. Abra-
ham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
11. See, eg., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT
AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1984) ("There is now a
mandated obligation on the part of an attorney to stop and think about his behav-
ior, whether it is pleadings, motions, discovery, or what have you . . . ."). Miller
served as Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules which developed the
1983 rule. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
882 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1993
The 1983 amendments were also intended to alter judicial
conduct by making trial judges more responsible for ridding the
courts of frivolous papers. The 1983 rule says judges "shall
impose" sanctions for violations of the signature require-
ment,12 whereas the 1938 rule provided only that attorneys
"may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." 3 Addi-
tionally, the 1983 rule requires sanctions for intentional and
unintentional violations, while the 1938 rule permitted disci-
plinary action only for willful violations.' 4 The 1983 amend-
ments were said to stress "a deterrent orientation,"" and were
intended to focus "the court's attention on the need to impose
sanctions for... abuses."" The only appropriate "sanction"
mentioned in the 1983 rule was "an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses in-
curred because of the filing... including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 7 The 1938 rule failed to elaborate on, or illus-
trate, what might constitute "appropriate" disciplinary action.
The 1983 amendments regarding frivolous papers consti-
tuted part of a broader judicial'8 and congressional 9 effort
aimed at deterring attorney misconduct. Much of the attention
before 1983 centered on discovery abuse.2' Although empirical
data was scarce,2' the federal rulemakers in 1983 evidently
believed that misconduct in the certification of litigation papers
Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 452 (1981) (containing the 1981 proposal which led to
the 1983 rule).
12. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 197. The mandatory nature of the
sanctioning authority did raise some concerns about judicial overreaching and con-
gressional prerogative. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power,
11 HoFsTRA L. REv. 997, 1009-11 (1983).
13. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 197.
14. Id. at 197.
15. Id. at 199-200 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11).
16. Id. at 200 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11).
17. Id. at 197.
18. Consider contemporary U.S. Supreme Court developments regarding the
inherent power to sanction. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123
(1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-67 (1980).
19. Consider the 1980 congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 so that
attorneys' fees may be assessed against attorneys who "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously" multiply proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
20. For a review of contemporary reports on discovery abuse, see Amend-
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 997-1001 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
21. Jeffrey A. Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the
Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 327 n.5.
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filed in civil cases undermined "the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every [civil] action."22 The 1983 amend-
ments were intended to stimulate more fair, prompt and afford-
able dispute resolution by reducing problems caused by frivo-
lous papers.
Not only was the 1983 rule heavily criticized at the outset,
but new critics emerged within a few years of its promulga-
tion.2 3 In fact, the 1983 amendments produced so much litera-
ture and litigation that in 1990 some federal rulemakers issued
a "call for written comments"2 on the recent Rule 11 experi-
ence. Many of the respondents stated25 that application of the
rule discriminated against certain lawyers or parties, while
others claimed that the procedures employed in sanctioning
were deficient. Additionally, the 1983 rule was deemed too
expensive by some, who viewed the resulting costs in satellite
litigation as exceeding any benefits. Further, there was concern
over the "incremental injury to the civility of litigation that
results from lawyers impugning one another's motives and
professionalism, and seeking to impose burdens directly on one
another."26
The 1990 call for comments was followed by a series of
proposed amendments to Rule 11 beginning in August 1991,27
22. FED. R. CIrv. P. 1.
23. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1013, 1013 (1988) (focusing on two problems with the 1983 rule: "the lack of pre-
dictability of the standard of compliance and the excessive amount of litigation the
rule generates").
24. Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Related Rules as Amended in 1983, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990) [hereinafter
Call for Comments].
25. With the assistance (much appreciated) of the federal rulemakers' staff,
the author reviewed all written correspondence relevant to the 1990 call on May
13, 1993 in Washington, D.C. Another who reviewed the correspondence has said:
"More than 125 individuals and groups provided written comments .... The prin-
cipal objections were that the Rule was fostering excessive, costly satellite litiga-
tion, that judges were inconsistently implementing the provision, that Rule 11
activity was disadvantaging civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, and that the Rule
was eroding civility among lawyers." Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U.
MLoI L. REV. 855, 862-63 (1992). The Advisory Committee, which triggered the
call for comments, also issued a report detailing its findings upon review of the
responsive correspondence and testimony. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Interim Report on Rule 11 (1991) [hereinafter Interim Report], reprinted in
GEORGENE M. VAIRo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVEN-
TIVE MEASURES, at 1-3 (App. I) (2d ed. 1992).
26. Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 346.
27. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
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which resulted in the 1993 rule.28
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 Draft] (including Advisory Committee Notes for the 1991 Draft).
28. The proposed 1993 amendments to Rule 11, together with the Advisory
Committee Notes for the 1993 rule, appear in Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 419-24, 577-92 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amend-
ments]. The 1993 rule is as follows:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representa-
tions to Court; Sanctions
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed
by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone
number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An
unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is cor-
rected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or
party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion,
or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary sup-
port or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of informa-
tion or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanc-
tion upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivi-
sion (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided
in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless,
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the
court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If war-
ranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing
the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held
jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and
employees.
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The 1993 rule "is intended to remedy problems that have
arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revi-
sion."'29 For example, the new rule removes the restrictive in-
terpretation of Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group,30 so that trial courts may sanction the law firms of
attorneys who present frivolous papers.31 Additionally, the
new rule seeks "to equalize the burden of the rule upon plain-
tiffs and defendants."32
Generally, the 1993 rule "places greater constraints on the
imposition of sanctions" 33 for rule violations by affording those
most subject to possible sanctions an opportunity to take cor-
rective action. This corrective action should typically occur
within at least 21 days after the opposing party gives particu-
larized notice of concern about alleged violations. 4 The
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivi-
sion (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why
it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation
of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of
the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dis-
missal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is,
or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the con-
duct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the
basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this
rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objec-
tions, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through
37.
29. Id. at 583 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
30. 493 U.S. 120 (1989) (holding the 1983 rule does not permit sanctions
against law firms, but only against the individual signer).
31. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 581-82 (Rule 11 (c)(1)(A) and
(c)(1)(M); id. at 588-89 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
32. Id. at 586 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
33. Id. at 584 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
34. While the 1993 rule indicates a motion for sanctions should be filed no
less than 21 days after the motion is served and no corrective action has been
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rulemakers contemplate a reduction in satellite litigation, be-
cause many violations are expected to be withdrawn or correct-
ed within the 21-day "safe harbor"35 period. Motions for sanc-
tions can be made only against those who have been provided
the safe harbor. Thus, while the 1983 rulemakers encouraged
attorneys to stop and think before signing litigation papers, the
1993 rulemakers allow many alleged violators to stop and
think again after their frivolous papers have already been pre-
sented.
Simultaneously, the 1993 rule broadens the range of those
ultimately responsible for frivolous papers. Some newer forms
of Rule 11 violations are created, such as violations by law
firms.36 Further, the 1993 rule replaces the signature require-
ment with a mandate that papers be properly "present[ed] to
the court.""7 This new duty broadens the range of those indi-
viduals accountable for frivolous papers by including within
presentations not only "signing," but also "filing, submitting, or
later advocating."38
Violations of the 1993 rule, even those surviving the safe
harbor period, no longer automatically trigger an appropriate
sanction. Rather, sanction decisions are left to the "significant
discretion" of the trial court.39 Further, the 1993 rule contem-
plates that every sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient
to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated," ° so that compensation is not the
primary motivator. The 1993 rule expressly recognizes as ap-
propriate sanctions "directives of a nonmonetary nature, an
order to pay a penalty into court, or... an order directing
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of
the violation."4 '
taken, a lengthier time period can be anticipated "in most cases" because counsel
should normally give 'informal" notice of concern about alleged frivolous papers
even before a Rule 11 motion is prepared. Id. at 591 (Advisory Committee Note to
1993 Rule 11).
35. Id. (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11 indicate parties will no
longer be "reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as
evidence of a violation of Rule 11.").
36. Id. at 588-89 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11 indicate the
change to law firm responsibilities.).
37. Id. at 579 (Rule 11(b)).
38. Id. at 579 (Rule 11(b)).
39. Id. at 587 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
40. Id. at 582 (Rule 11(c)(2)).
41. Id. Sanctions involving "directives of a nonmonetary nature" include court
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While the 1993 rule should reduce the number of motions
seeking Rule 11 sanctions because the safe harbor period will
frequently be used, it should also prompt a greater number of
court-initiated inquiries into so-called public interest sanctions
against lawyers. These sanctions are expressly recognized un-
der the new rule.42 They also provide a vehicle for judges to
address intentional and unintentional misconduct of lawyers
before them, even when no private party complains.
One of the more significant forms of public interest sanc-
tions, expressly recognized in the new rule, is a monetary as-
sessment involving penalties paid into court." While such
penalties were occasionally ordered under the 1983 rule,44 and
perhaps under its predecessor,45 their recognition under the
new rule should trigger at least a small cottage industry. Seem-
ingly, under the 1993 rule, fines against lawyers can be ordered
for many forms of Rule 11 violations, even where the miscon-
duct is withdrawn or corrected soon after concern is expressed
by either an adverse party (via the notice preceding any mo-
tion) or by the judge (via a "show cause" order).4" The
aforenoted safe harbor is available chiefly for rule violators
seeking to avoid fee awards. Because attorneys' fees may only
be awarded when other sanctions provide "ineffective" deter-
rence47 and after time has been allotted for the withdrawal or
orders "striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure;
requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; . . . [and] refer-
ring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys,
to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head)" Id. at 587 (Advisory
Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
42. Id. at 582 (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)).
43. Id. (Rule 11(c)(2)).
44. VAIRO, supra note 25, at 9-53 to 9-62 (reviewing cases); see also Jeffrey A.
Parness, More Stringent Sanctions Under Federal Civil Rule 11: A Reply to Profes-
sor Nelken, 75 GEO. L.J. 1937 (1987) (urging that the 1983 rule should not be read
to proscribe monetary sanctions in excess of a party's costs and fees).
45. While there may have been no reported cases of fines under the 1938
rule, D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Strik-
ing" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-37
(1976) (reviewing reported cases), the availability of "punitive" fines was recognized
by at least some commentators, id. at 43.
46. Specifically, the 1993 rule allows court initiatives on all rule violations,
1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 582 (Rule 11 (c)(1)(B)), whether or not cor-
rected during the safe harbor period, and only disallows court initiatives regarding
monetary sanctions if voluntary dismissal or settlement has occurred, id. at 583
(Rule 11 (c)(2)(B)), thus seemingly permitting nonmonetary sanctions (such as bar
disciplinary referrals) against attorneys who have corrected their frivolous papers.
47. Id. at 587-88 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). There is no
explanation of why fines payable to the court are more effective deterrents of Rule
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correction of the misconduct, motions for fees under the 1993
rule should be filed with the court far less frequently.4" Thus,
fines should constitute the chief form of monetary sanction
umder the 1993 rule,49 typically coming after a court has taken
"initiative," not after a party's motion. And, there is good rea-
son to believe fines will often be chosen over other nonmone-
tary sanctions available against lawyers.5" Initiatives regard-
ing fines may be difficult, however, because private parties
have little incentive to inform the court about much Rule 11
misconduct, especially if it has been withdrawn or corrected.
Under the 1993 rule, such withdrawn or corrected misconduct
has been the subject of an earlier notice of concern served upon
the parties, but not "filed with or presented to the court."51
11 misconduct than awards of attorneys' fees. Perhaps the federal rulemakers
found that the lure of attorneys' fees caused excessive Rule 11 motions and thus
too much satellite litigation, anE that federal judges could be trusted to detect and
act wisely regarding significant Rule 11 misconduct, even though the injured party
might not help much since there is little incentive to move for sanctions. Given the
1990 Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 347 (soliciting evidence), and the vary-
ing studies of the 1983 rule employed by the 1993 rulemakers, 1993 Amendments,
supra note 28, at 583-84 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11), the decision
to abandon fee awards may have been undertaken with an "empirical approach."
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 455, 484-85 (1993) (direct observation and experience used). Yet, the
decision to move to fines as a chief means of deterrence seems grounded on the
rilemakers' (more frequently employed) "rationalistic approach," as there was little
examination of (or experimentation with) fines. Id. at 484-88 (rationalistic approach
employs reason and intuition alone); infra notes 55-92 and accompanying text (re-
view of 1993 rulemakers' consideration of fines and of information on fines supplied
to the rulemakers).
48. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 584 (Advisory Committee Note to
1993 Rule 11). Motions for fees most typically will be made where frivolous papers
remain unwithdrawn or uncorrected after concern is expressed by the movant and
where those papers were presented for improper purposes, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Id. at 588
(Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11 find fees most appropriate for the "un-
usual" circumstance of a Rule 11(b)(1) violation). Compare the proposed amend-
ments to the discovery rules, which permit fees for discovery abuse where there is
no improper purpose. Id. at 684-85 (Rule 37 (a)(4)(A)).
49. "Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to com-
pensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordi-
narily be paid into court as a penalty." Id. at 587-88 (Advisory Committee Note to
1993 Rule 11).
50. On the available nonmonetary sanctions, see id. at 582 (Rule 11 (c)(2)).
On why fines often are more effective than these other sanctions, see Stephen G.
Pen6, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys? An Economic Approach to Lawyer Discipline
Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1991) (stating that fines are preferable to other
sanctions in many attorney discipline situations).
51. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 581 (Rule 11(c)(1)(A)).
FINES UNDER NEW RULE 11
The reduction in Rule 11 motions and the increase in Rule 11
court initiatives will signal a move from a time when opposing
counsel often inquires into whether an attorney reasonably
stopped and thought before filing, to a time when the govern-
ment, as the public representative, frequently asks whether an
attorney reasonably stopped and thought again after being put
on notice of an opposing party's concern.
The procedural mechanisms and substantive criteria rele-
vant to fines, a public interest sanction, vary dramatically from
the guidelines for awards of attorneys' fees, a private interest
sanction. While both may provide a remedy for similar litiga-
tion misconduct, the purposes behind public and private inter-
est sanctions are typically quite different and thus the nature
of remedial relief chosen is usually quite different.52 Public
interest sanctions are most often intended to address the harm
caused the public at large, while private interest sanctions are
intended, in significant part at least, to address the harm
caused particular individuals or entities; thus, public interest
sanctions are usually considered at the urging of a public rep-
resentative, while private interest sanctions are typically re-
quested by certain individuals or entities who have been
harmed. In considering harm to the public caused by civil liti-
gation misconduct, the public representative is often most in-
terested in protecting scarce governmental resources, general
deterrence, quasi-criminal punishment, and professional disci-
pline. The same misconduct causes a private party to focus on
gaining compensation for personal loss, specific deterrence, and
perhaps punitive damages (possibly constituting a windfall).
Public interest sanctions for civil litigation misconduct are
frequently raised and adjudicated by judges on their own initia-
tive upon evidence of especially egregious behavior, with these
judges then left in the somewhat uncomfortable position of
performing both executive and judicial functions. These judges
may also need to undertake legislative functions where the
guidelines for public interest sanctions are unclear, and to
serve as witnesses when the misconduct occurred in their pres-
ence or when the reasonable person standard is applicable. By
contrast, private interest sanctions for litigation misconduct are
52. For a general discussion of public and private interest sanctions under
the 1983 rule, see Jeffrey A. Parness, The New Method of Regulating Lawyers:
Public and Private Interest Sanctions During Civil Litigation for Attorney Miscon-
duct, 47 LA. L. REV. 1305 (1987).
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frequently urged in adversarial settings where judges can re-
main more disinterested. In sum, there are very different fac-
tors utilized when public representatives and private parties
raise concerns over the very same civil litigation misconduct.
Under the 1993 rule and its legislative history, a variety of
forms of public interest sanctions beyond fines are contemplat-
ed. They include an admonition, a reprimand or a censure; an
order requiring participation in an educational program; and a
disciplinary referral.5 3 The noted private interest sanctions
under the 1993 rule include an order striking an offending pa-
per and a fee award.54
B. The Intent Behind the Push for More Public Interest
Sanctions in the 1990s
What prompted the federal rulemakers to encourage more
public interest sanctions against lawyers? The rulemakers
seemed chiefly concerned with channeling attention away from
compensation and toward deterrence, with assuring fair appli-
cation of Rule 11, with reducing satellite litigation, and with
restoring judicial discretion in the imposition of sanctions. The
rulemakers rejected the urging of many that the rule be re-
turned to its pre-1983 form (or to something comparable), so
that only willful violations would be addressed and so that a
disciplinary action would be the sole sanction. Trial judges
retain the power under the 1993 rule to remedy both intention-
al and unintentional actions through a variety of remedies.
While the goals of the 1993 rule are somewhat clear, the
particular ways in which public interest sanctions will serve
these goals are far from clear. Certainly, the newly recognized
authority of district judges to issue "show cause" orders on
their own "initiative" invites greater consideration of public
interest sanctions. To support the call for more public interest
sanctions, the federal rulemakers also referred to the Manual
for Complex Litigation when discussing "the variety of possible
sanctions."55 The Manual does include within its recognized
"types of sanctions" the imposition of a "fine."5" Yet, the Man-
ual does not say much about when fines are most appropriate.




56. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 42.3 (2d ed. 1985).
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The Manual does say that in imposing any sanction, a court
should consider "the nature of the sanctionable conduct, its
consequences on others, and the purposes to be served by a
sanction."17 The drafters of the 1993 rule otherwise give little
guidance on how district judges will determine when public
interest sanctions might be considered, which of the possible
public interest sanctions is most appropriate, or when relevant
misconduct has even occurred. Further, injured parties and
opposing lawyers have little incentive, and no widely recog-
nized duty, to inform the court about the misconduct of others,
so district judges will often have difficulty learning of Rule 11
violations.
Before deciding to encourage more public interest sanc-
tions, particularly fines, in the 1993 rule, the federal
rulemakers did consider the responses to the 1990 call for com-
ments, as well as prior case law and commentaries on the 1983
rule.58 Only a few of the responses to its 1990 call, however,
addressed fines payable to the court; none mentioned the Man-
ual for Complex Litigation; and few discussed in any detail the
procedural or substantive guidelines for fines.59
The American College of Trial Lawyers" recommended in
October 1990 certain amendments to the 1983 rule, including a
proposal that a frivolous paper could prompt an order for pay-
ment of "the amount of reasonable expenses, not to include
attorneys' fees, incurred" because of the rule violation.6 This
order might be accompanied by "an additional monetary sanc-
tion,"62 with all "monetary sanctions" to be "paid into the reg-
istry account of the clerk of the district court." 3
57. Id.
58. Prior to 1990, a slowly emerging body of cases appeared which supported
fines under the 1983 rule and other sanctions authority. See infra notes 93-104
and accompanying text. Earlier commentary supporting greater consideration of
fines includes Parness, supra note 21, at 354 ("Cost recovery by the government
should constitute part of the trial court's sanctioning arsenal pursuant to Rule 11
because there are times when no other sanctions may be effective.").
59. With the assistance (much appreciated) of the federal rulemakers' staff,
the author reviewed all written correspondence relevant to the 1990 call on May
13, 1993 in Washington, D.C. Of course, the responses to the 1990 call do not
constitute the legislative intent behind the 1993 rule, Bancorp Leasing & Fin.
Corp. v. Augusta Aviation, 813 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir. 1987), but they are evi-
dence of what the rulemakers were thinking when proposing the rule.
60. Letter from American College of Trial Lawyers to Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (Oct. 28, 1990) (copy on file with author).
61. Id., Addendum 2, at 2.
62. Id.
63. Id., Addendum 2, at 3. In rejecting the possibility of attorneys' fees, the
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In the fall of 1990, the Chicago Council of Lawyers64 also
urged that new forms of sanctions be expressly recognized.
Specifically, the Council sought an amendment to "make clear
that a non-monetary sanction is a legitimate form of sanction
under the Rule," 5 urging that Rule 11 should expressly recog-
nize a reprimand.66
In the fall of 1990, the Chicago Bar Association 7 urged
that "greater consideration be given to non-monetary sanctions"
under Rule 11.68 Its proposal contemplated that no attorneys'
fees be awarded unless other sanctions were "insufficient to
deter future violations and that the amount of the sanction is
the least severe sufficient to deter future violations.' 9 Besides
attorneys' fees, the sanctions endorsed by the Association in-
cluded continuing legal education; the use of unpublished, rath-
er than published, opinions; and the requirement that law
firms "institute internal approval procedures to assure that
future filings comply with the rule."7"
Like the Chicago associations, the National Bar Associa-
tion7 asked federal rulemakers to direct more attention to
nonmonetary sanctions. On behalf of a membership heavily
involved in federal civil rights litigation,72 the Association sug-
gested that federal judges be "encouraged to utilize innovative
approaches as a preferred deterrence to monetary sanctions in
light of the dearth of attorneys who choose to practice civil
rights law and the unprofitability of practicing civil rights
College characterized "whether or not the sanctioned person should pay the
opponent's legal fees" as a close question. Id. at 4. The College stood by its Octo-
ber 1990 proposal after an early version of the 1993 rule was issued about a year
later. See Letter from American College of Trial Lawyers to Secretary, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 14, 1991) (copy on file with author).
64. Letter from Chicago Council of Lawyers to Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure (Nov. 1990) (copy on file with author).
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
67. Comment of the Chicago Bar Association, Submitted to Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
(Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Comment of Chicago Bar] (copy on fie with author).
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 12.
71. Rule 11 and Civil Rights Lawyers: Comments of National'Bar Association
in Response to Call for Comments Issued by the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules, Judicial Conference of the United States (Nov. 1, 1990) (copy on file with
author).
72. Id. at 1.
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law." 3 Possible approaches were said to include private and
public reprimands, referrals to state disciplinary bodies, attor-
ney license suspensions, and required legal education. 4
At the same time, Professor Victor H. Kramer 5 urged
that Rule 11 be rewritten so that it would serve as "an instru-
ment to improve professional responsibility 7' and thus be-
come "primarily a lawyer discipline device. 77 He suggested
that a new rule include as an appropriate sanction "an order to
pay to the clerk of the court a civil penalty ... in the nature of
a fine,7 8 which would serve to "compensate the courts for
causing them to engage in needless expense arising from frivo-
lous litigation.7 9
A few other professors joined in the fall of 1990 in urging
the move from fees to fines or from private to public interest
sanctions. Professors Dennis Curtin and Judith Resnick indi-
cated their understanding that this move was "emerging" as a
"central" recommendation." They supported the move, indi-
cating it would "reduce the amount of monetary fines im-
posed"' and could provide "money ... either for continuing
legal education or for the provision of legal services to pro se
litigants."" They suggested fines be "limited" in amount 3
and should only come after other public interest sanctions,
including "mandatory legal education," were considered.'
And, Professor John Leubsdorf urged federal rulemakers "to
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id. at 14-15.
75. Letter from Professor Victor H. Kramer, University of Minnesota Law
School, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Oct. 23, 1990) (copy on
file with author).
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 5-6. He further urged that each federal district "should adopt a
local rule to provide that every violation of Rule 11 by a lawyer will be reported
to the disciplinary authority in the state in which the offending lawyer both has
been authorized to practice law and has his own principal office." Id. at 4. For a
further elaboration of Professor Kramer's views, see Victor H. Kramer, Viewing
Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793
(1991).
80. Letter from Professors Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnick, University of
Southern California Law Center, to The Honorable Sam Pointer 2 (Nov. 21, 1990)
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replace the present discretionary sanctioning provisions" of
Rule 11 "with a requirement of fixed but relatively small law-
yer fines."85 This would drive the sanctioning scheme toward
deterrence and away from compensation," and "provide pro-
tection against sanctions that are unfairly large.""7
Between publication of the proposed amendments to Rule
11 in August 1991 and the communication of the 1993 rule by
the U.S. Supreme Court to Congress in April 1993, others
joined in supporting the move from private to public interest
sanctions."8 But they too have provided little assistance on the
procedural or substantive criteria which should guide the impo-
sition of increasing numbers of fines and other public interest
sanctions. For example, a bench-bar proposal to revise Rule 11
was issued by a distinguished group of judges and lawyers
shortly after the August 1991 proposed amendments to Rule 11
appeared. 9 That proposal recommended that the sole Rule 11
sanction be an "appropriate" monetary payment "into the regis-
try account of the clerk of the district court."9 ° While the pro-
ponents indicated their provision was "taken directly from the
proposal of the American College of Trial Lawyers,"9' they
failed to indicate why they rejected the College's proposal al-
lowing recovery of a private party's expenses, not including
attorneys' fees.9
85. Letter from John Leubsdorf, Visiting Professor, Columbia University
School of Law, to Professor Paul Carrington 1 (Nov. 16, 1990) (copy on file with
author).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. Of course, many who found fault with the 1983 rule criticized the 1991
proposal, including its projected move from fees to fines. See, e.g., Carl Tobias,
Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IowA L. REV. 1775,
1793 (1992) (suggesting a prohibition of all monetary sanctions). Since the 1993
rule was sent to Congress, much of the criticism of the Rule 11 proposal has abat-
ed. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of Trial Run, NAT'L L.J., June 21,
1993, at 15, 16 (urging Congress to allow the 1993 rule to take effect). Yet, signifi-
cant criticism of changes in the discovery rules, which accompanied the 1993 rule
to Congress, continues. Id.; Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L L.J., May
24, 1993, at 1, 33.
89. Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159
(1991) (the proposal was submitted by three federal circuit judges, six lawyers and
a law professor) [hereinafter Bench-Bar Proposal]. For a more complete comparison
of the Bench-Bar Proposal with the amendments to Rule 11 circulated in 1991 and
found in 1991 Draft, supra note 27, see Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are
and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 495-501 (1991).
90. Bench-Bar Proposal, supra note 89, at 165.
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id. The College viewed the availability of attorneys' fees under Rule 11 as
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In sum, the 1993 version of Federal Civil Rule 11 should
prompt fewer motions seeking attorneys' fees, but more court
initiatives regarding alleged attorney misconduct. There should
be a greater number of fines. Yet, the federal judges will need
to develop on a case-by-case basis, and perhaps through local
rules, the procedural mechanisms and substantive criteria for
fines and other public interest sanctions since the rulemakers
have provided little guidance. When fines have been ordered
under the 1938 and 1983 rules, the results often were both
unfair and uneven. This history further challenges the judges
responsible for implementing the 1993 rule.
III. FINES UNDER THE OLD AND NEW RuLE 11
While the 1993 rule encourages fines, orders of penalties
paid to the court were occasionally issued under the earlier
versions of Rule 11. After this experience is described, fines
under the new rule will be explored.
A. Fines Under the Old Rule 11
As noted, the 1938 version of Rule 11 covered only willful
violations, which, when found, might only subject an attorney
"to appropriate disciplinary action."93 By comparison, the 1983
version contemplated both willful and nonwillful violations,
which, when found, must trigger "an appropriate sanction,"
exemplified only by an order requiring the reimbursement of
"reasonable expenses... including a reasonable attorney's
fee."" Assuming comparable willful violations, both versions
of the rule seemingly allowed a fine as a form of "appropriate"
sanction, and the 1983 rule may have allowed fines even for
certain forms of nonwillful conduct.95 Yet neither rule man-
dated, encouraged, or generated many fines. In the last few
years, however, the 1983 rule, together with comparable rules
on discovery" and appellate practice, 7 have prompted a
a close question. Supra note 63.
93. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 197.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Pravic v. United States Indus.-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623-24
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (ordering fine paid to court for unreasonable conduct in failing to
make inquiry).
96. See, e.g., Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.R.D. 57, 67 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(ordering fine under civil discovery rule to cover some of taxpayers' costs due to
plaintiff's intentional disobedience).
97. See, eg., In re Pritzker, 762 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1985) (using Federal Rules
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slowly growing number of federal court fines. The predominant
legal issues raised have concerned process, not the guiding
substantive criteria.
Both cases9" and commentaries99 have addressed the
need for notice, opportunity to be heard, and articulated find-
ings when fines are ordered under Rule 11. Typically, fines
have occurred in settings where at least one private party
moved for attorneys' fees and a fine was ordered during a rul-
ing on the motion; often the fine was not requested by the
movant, and the possibility of a fine was never raised by the
court prior to its ruling.' Occasionally, fines have been or-
dered after "show cause" orders were served. 1 1
Usually, fines under the 1983 rule were imposed only upon
findings of willful violations. Such fines have taken two forms:
compensatory and punitive. Compensatory fines usually seek to
reimburse0 2 the judiciary for at least some, if not all,"0 3 of
of Appellate Procedure 46(c)); Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncer-
tain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 868 (noting fines have been levied
based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c), recognizing "appropriate disci-
plinary action" may be taken after a "show cause" hearing); see also Kleiner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 1985) (ordering fine against
counsel for intentional misconduct under inherent power); Miranda v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983) (assessing fines against both attor-
neys under local court rule); Roy v. American Professional Mktg., Inc., 117 F.R.D.
687, 692-93 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (ordering monies to be paid to court clerk for pretri-
al misconduct under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)).
98. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1987).
99. For an early view, see Michael S. Cooper, Comment, Financial Penalties
Imposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt
Power, 26 UCLA L. REV. 855, 882-91 (1979).
100. See, e.g., Warshay v. Guinness PLC, 750 F. Supp. 628, 639-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991). In one unusual case, the trial court
ordered fines while granting a motion for fees, but lowered their amounts because
those assessed "were likely unaware that such a sanction might be imposed." Advo
Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
101. In one federal circuit, fines against attorneys for trial court misconduct
must be accompanied by procedural protections under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 46(c), see discussion supra note 97, which requires a hearing and an
opportunity to show cause. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 522-23.
102. Some decisions have expressly employed an hourly rate for a court's time.
Advo Sys., 110 F.R.D. at 433 (six hundred dollars). Other courts have not em-
ployed an hourly rate. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Stern, 136 F.R.D. 63, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that improper conduct consumed equivalent of two court
days); Olga's Kitchen of Hayward, Inc. v. Papo, 108 F.R.D. 695, 711 (E.D. Mich.
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1987) (one-thousand-
dollar fine ordered without explanation of source of amount, but with references to
wasted judicial resources).
103. See Parness, supra nob 52, at 1313 (raising equal treatment questions
where courts fail to explain why only partial reimbursement is ordered and where
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the costs incurred in handling frivolous papers. Punitive fines
typically seek to deter future misconduct, where the amount is
unconnected to wasted judicial resources."'
B. Fines Under the New Rule 11
In inviting increasing fines, the drafters of the 1993 rule
provided some guidance on the applicable procedural and sub-
stantive standards. The new rule expressly mandates that
there be "notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond" prior
to the imposition of any sanction. °5 Clearly, fines can be or-
dered upon notice of, and an opportunity to respond to, a court-
initiated inquiry into Rule 11 misconduct;"°6 perhaps they can
also follow a hearing on a private party's motion for sanc-
tions,"0 7 though such motions will be infrequent.' Further,
the 1993 rules indicate a sanction order must be accompanied
by a description of the conduct determined to violate the
rule, 0 9 as well as an explanation of "the basis for the sanc-
tion imposed,""0 whether requested or not.
At least six major issues face federal judges who seek to
fine attorneys presenting frivolous papers under the 1993 rule:
guidelines are nonexistent); Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525,
548 (4th Cir. 1990) (willingness to endorse awards of only "nominal court expenses
not provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1920," since guidelines for larger awards should be
reserved for legislation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
104. See, e.g., Warshay, 750 F. Supp. at 640 (imposing fine to deter "abusive
litigation practices"); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 660
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (imposing $10,000 fine on each of three lawyers to deter others
and to punish), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505,
525 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that fines were based improperly on out of court con-
siderations), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
105. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 580 (Rule 11(c)).
106. Id. at 582 (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)) (indicates a "show cause" order should de-
scribe "the specific conduct that appears to violate" the rule).
107. With both court initiatives and party motions, notice must be given of
"the specific conduct that appears to violate" the rule; attorneys' fees are to be
awarded only where "warranted" and are not preferred; and, trial judges have
"significant discretion." Id. at 581-82 (Rule 11(cXl)(A), (B)).
108. The rule drafters indicated that a party may only be awarded attorneys'
fees after a safe harbor has been provided and where fees are necessary to deter
repetition of the "conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Id.
at 582 (Rule 11(c)(2)). Movants for fees will likely stress their opponents presented
papers for improper purposes, "such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id. at 580 (Rule 11 (b)(1)). With the ex-
pected drop in Rule 11 motions, fines should increasingly be dependent upon court
"initiative." Id. at 582 (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)).
109. Id. at 583 (Rule 11 (c)(3)).
110. Id.
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(1) the manner in which the judges will become informed about
possible lawyer misconduct, since there will be fewer Rule 11
movants; (2) the additional procedures necessary before fines
can be levied; (3) the type of conduct for which Rule 11 fines
might be imposed; (4) who will pay the fine; (5) the manner in
which federal trial courts will employ the uncontrolled discre-
tion afforded them in the 1993 rule to fine attorneys; and (6)
the uncertain relationship between Rule 11 proceedings and
other public interest proceedings, such as bar disciplinary ac-
tions, which can involve the very same litigation misconduct.
1. Learning of lawyer misconduct
With fewer Rule 11 motions, how will judges learn of attor-
ney misconduct which might prompt a fine? One solution is to
mandate (or at least encourage) those involved in civil litiga-
tion to report their beliefs about significant Rule 11 attorney
misconduct which will not otherwise likely be subject to any
court initiative or motion. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for lawyers already require reports to disciplinary
agencies when substantial questions are raised about another
lawyer's conduct."' A reporting rule for serious Rule 11 mis-
conduct could easily be incorporated into local federal court
rules, which could require, for example, reports of especially
egregious conduct that has been withdrawn or corrected during
a safe harbor period."'
Such a reporting rule would not interfere with bar disci-
plinary responsibilities." 3  Additionally, it would address
somewhat Justice Scalia's concerns in opposing the 1993 rule.
Scalia urged that the net effect of the new standard would be
"to decrease the incentive on the part of the person best situat-
111. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1992) [hereinafter
MODEL RuLEs] ("A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as
to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects
shall inform the appropriate professional authority."); cf. id. Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer
shall not ...assert .. .an issue . . . unless there is a basis for doing so that is
not frivolous." Frivolous issues ar described in the accompanying note as requiring
an objective test.).
112. While egregious conduct which is corrected within the safe harbor period
may not support a fee award, nevertheless it still constitutes a violation to which
a court may apply certain sanctions on its initiative. See supra note 48.
113. MODEL RULEs, supra note 111, Rule 8.3 cmt. (recognizing that serious
offenses may be referred to other agencies "more appropriate in the circumstances"
and that less serious offenses require no bar disciplinary agency report).
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ed to alert the court to [the] perversion of our civil justice sys-
tem."'1 4 Thus, a reporting rule could cover flagrant miscon-
duct, such as pleadings apparently filed without any prefiling
inquiry or motions seemingly intended to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay, even when the papers have been with-
drawn. A mandatory reporting provision should at least encom-
pass reports by attorneys, since they are court officers as well
as the zealous advocates of private interests and thus are more
justifiably subject to the courts' dictates on professional behav-
ior. A voluntary reporting provision could also cover
nonlawyers, particularly litigants harmed by the Rule 11 mis-
conduct of their adversaries' attorneys.
This reporting rule would be consistent with the intent of
the Rule 11 reformers dating to the 1983 amendments. Profes-
sor Arthur Miller, the reporter to the committee which primari-
ly drafted the 1983 changes, said this about the 1983 rule
when it first took effect:
We have lived so long with the emphasis on "duty to client"
that redirecting the responsibilities of lawyers to the system
is easier said than done. Yet once it is understood that the
court system is a societal resource, not merely the private
playpen of the litigants, the difficult task of discouraging
hyperactivity must be undertaken.
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure represent a modest step in that direction." 5
2. Process of fining lawyers
With the decrease in Rule 11 motions, what process will
provide the required "notice and ... reasonable opportunity to
respond""' 6 for hearings on fines under the 1993 rule? Notice
should come pursuant to a "show cause" order issued under
Rule 11(c)(1)(B), which describes the specific conduct that alleg-
edly violates the rule."' Unlike past practice, notice by way
of a private party's motion should usually be inadequate."'
As well, the notice should provide some guidance on the stan-
dards to be applied and the procedures to be employed at the
114. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 509.
115. Arthur Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
116. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 580 (Rule 11(c)).
117. Id. at 582.
118. Cf. supra note 100.
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hearing. For example, it should indicate whether oral or writ-
ten testimony will be entertained and whether discovery is
available.' Finally, the notice should indicate whether the
judge might consider other public interest sanctions, including
a reprimand, a bar disciplinary referral, or an order requiring
participation in an educational program. Boilerplate "show
cause" orders could easily be incorporated into local rules.
Because hearings required for compensatory fines under
Rule 11 seemingly trigger fewer constitutional rights than do
hearings for punitive fines, 2 ' and because all conduct
prompting a possible Rule 11 fine has caused some wasted
judicial resources, Rule 11 fines should be limited to those
which compensate wholly or partially for societal loss. Punitive
fines arising from conduct violating Rule 11 are still available
during more traditional disciplinary hearings before attorney
regulatory commissions and the like.
The opportunity to be heard on compensatory fines should
vary depending upon the relevant factual and legal issues. On
occasion, it seems appropriate for a federal judge to appoint a
special public representative to urge the public interest, as can
occur in some contempt settings;.2 ' such a representative of-
ten should not be an attorney otherwise involved in the law-
suit." The representative might be an attorney who is em-
119. The legislative history of the 1993 rule indicates the availability of the
opportunity for written submissions, oral arguments, or "evidentiary presentation
will depend on the circumstances." 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 589 (Adv-
isory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11) (parentheses omitted).
120. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559 n.10 (11th Cir. 1987)
("It may be that the monetary sanction . . . is ... so arguably unrelated to the
misconduct that due process will require extensive due process safeguards.");
Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va.
1992) (stating that coercive civil contempt fines in fixed amounts not measured by
any harm suffered by civil party may raise due process and excessive fines con-
cerns), cert. granted sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 113 S. Ct.
2,139 (1993).
121. In some contempt settings, appointment is required. See Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 809 n.21 (1987) (finding, under its
supervisory authority, that a criminal contemner has a right to a disinterested
prosecutor, who cannot be the successful civil litigant whose injunction was alleged-
ly disobeyed); see also Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1124 n.1 (3d Cir.
1990) (finding no "concrete adverseness" as plaintiffs did not appear during
defendants' appeal of fine payable to the court) (citation omitted); Snow Machs.,
Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 726 (3d Cir. 1988) (expressing surprise that prob-
lem of public representation in fine cases has received no attention, but offering
"no solutions").
122. At times, such an attorney would have conflicting interests if appointed;
consider settings involving unwithdrawn frivolous papers presented for an improper
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ployed by the court in the clerk's office, or who is an assistant
United States Attorney. If needed, compensation for such pub-
lic representatives who normally work in the private sector
could come from the fines earlier collected in other cases. 1"
Jury trials need not be conducted,1" and the burden of proof
may need only be preponderance of the evidence."2
3. Conduct warranting fines
What type of conduct might warrant a Rule 11 penalty
paid into court? Seemingly, negligent presentation of frivolous
papers alone should not suffice. Sufficient deterrents for such
future conduct by the same or other attorneys already ex-
ist, 26 and thus fines for simple negligence should be deemed
barred under the 1993 rule as deterrence is now to be the chief
goal behind Rule 11 sanctions. On the other hand, intentional
misconduct-such as presenting frivolous papers for the pur-
pose of harassment-should always subject the wrongdoer to
the possibility of a fine. Fines provide an efficient tool for deter-
ring attorneys specially and generally from future Rule 11
violations. The economic interests which drove many attorneys
and parties to seek fee awards under the 1983 rule should
prove to be quite different from the motivations of judges who
will initiate inquiries into compensatory fines under the 1993
rule.
What of fines for misconduct which is more culpable than
purpose, where both fines and fee awards to the attorney's clients could be urged.
See supra note 48; see also Snow Machs., Inc., 838 F.2d at 726 n.6 (noting the
possibility of appointing an amicus).
123. Cf. Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Con-
tempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 90 (1992)
(noting the funding problem for appointed counsel in criminal contempt cases).
124. But see Parness, supra note 52, at 1314 (uncertainty on the need for a
jury to assess Rule 11 punitive fines, but not for Rule 11 compensatory fines).
125. But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982) (discussing when
"fair preponderance of the evidence" standard may be unconstitutional); Donaldson
v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559 n.10 (11th Cir. 1987) ("It may be that the monetary
sanction being considered in a specific case is so severe in amount . . . that due
process will require extensive due process safeguards as prerequisites to its imposi-
tion.").
126. Notice of an opposing party's concern about negligent presentations can
always be served; if such presentations are not corrected, they can be stricken
upon motion. See supra note 54. Further, reprimands and orders of continuing
education are some of the public interest sanctions available to address such con-
duct. See 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 587 (Advisory Committee Note to
1993 Rule 11).
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negligence, but not quite intentional' (however intentional
is defined" )? The legislative history to the 1993 rule pro-
vides some guidance by indicating that "show cause orders will
ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a con-
tempt of court."1" Civil contempt settings, at least, need not
involve allegations of bad intent.3 ° Thus, compensatory fines
under Rule 11 should be available for conduct which does not
involve bad intent, but is serious enough that adequate deter-
rence requires some fine payable to the court. While somewhat
imprecise, the term "egregious misconduct" could serve as a
guidepost.
4. Paying the fine
Normally, attorneys should be held personally liable for
any compensatory fines resulting from their own presentations
of papers deemed violative of Rule 11. Yet, recall that the 1993
rule also now allows judges to sanction law firms of attorneys
who have presented frivolous papers. 3' Should law firms ev-
er be assessed joint liability for the fines incurred by their law-
yers? Should law firms ever be fined even where their responsi-
ble personnel are not fined personally?
When attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses are
awarded against an attorney for presenting a frivolous paper,
the 1993 rule provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstanc-
es, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations
127. In a similar setting, federal courts have divided on the standards for
awarding attorneys' fees due to unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of litiga-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Janet E. Josselyn, Note, The Song of the Si-
rens-Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1990)
(circuits split on negligent versus reckless or willful bad faith conduct).
128. Cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1710 (1993) ("willful"
conduct under Age Discrimination in Employment Act includes conduct showing
reckless disregard for whether acts were prohibited by statute); Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (accused must know his conduct was illegal to attempt
"willfully" to evade income tax).
129. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 592 (Advisory Committee Note to
1993 Rule 11).
130. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (holding bad
intent not a prerequisite to civil contempt).
131. Specifically, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) allows sanctions against "law firms ... that
...are responsible for the violation." 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 580-81;
see also Edward A. Adams, Bar: Discipline Rules Should Cover Firms, NAT'L L.J.,
July 5, 1993, at 10 (A committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York has urged that the New York attorney disciplinary rules should be extended
to cover law firms.).
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committed by its partners, associates, and employees."" 2 Ad-
ditionally, the 1993 rule expressly permits court initiatives on
public interest sanctions to be directed to law firms regarding
all forms of Rule 11 violations." The legislative history to
the new rule further indicates that ordinarily, law firm respon-
sibility for its agents' misconduct is to follow "established prin-
ciples of agency."'' Thus, the 1993 rule clearly warrants that
in most instances joint liability be assigned law firms for com-
pensatory fines levied against their personnel.'35
The joint responsibility of law firms for such compensatory
fines would also promote one of the major goals behind the
1993 rule, the additional deterrence of Rule 11 attorney mis-
conduct. The 1993 amendment expressly provides that Rule 11
sanctions are to be "limited to what is sufficient to deter repeti-
tion of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated."'36 With law firm liability, not only will law firms
have some economic incentive to better monitor their personnel
so that frivolous papers are not presented by their offices, but
they will also have greater incentives to monitor internal oper-
ations so as to avoid federal court inquiry into how the fnms'
policies and practices may have led to frivolous paper presenta-
tions. Additionally, attorneys will become more concerned about
exposing others to the costs of their own sins.
Under the 1983 rule, trial courts occasionally sought to
motivate reforms within law firms in order to reduce the chanc-
es of future Rule 11 misconduct. For example, one judge or-
dered that his opinion finding a Rule 11 violation in the ways
in which legal memoranda had been prepared be circulated
among all partners and associates of the law firms employing
the errant lawyers.' 3 Presumedly, the hope, in part, was to
stimulate debate on, and facilitate any necessary changes to,
the firm's established approach to legal memoranda."
132. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 581 (Rule ll(c)(1)(A)).
133. Id. at 582 (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)).
134. Id. at 589 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11).
135. The rule further allows sanctions against individuals and law firms who
helped others present frivolous papers, though they themselves did not "actually"
make the presentations. Id.
136. Id. at 582 (Rule 11(c)(2)).
137. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D.
Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
138. Elsewhere, this federal judge has written:
The impact of a reprimand is greatly increased by including it in a pub-
lished order. Publication enhances the deterrent effect of sanctions and
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Furthermore, at times under the 1993 rule, compensatory
fines should be levied upon law firms even where there are no
parallel fines upon any individuals. It is easily imaginable that
the fining of a law firm might be the most effective deterrent to
the repetition of misconduct by those within the firm, while
other sanctions, such as bar disciplinary referrals or repri-
mands or required continuing legal education, would be most
effective in deterring the repetition of the conduct by the indi-
vidual attorney involved. As contrasted with the 1983 rule
which urged individual attorneys to stop and think about their
litigation papers before signing them, the 1993 rule should
prompt trial judges to urge law firms to stop and think about
their internal practices which may have contributed to the
presentation of a frivolous paper.
5. Uncontrolled discretion to fine
Yet another difficulty facing courts contemplating compen-
satory fines of lawyers under the 1993 rule is how to exercise
wisely the delegated discretion as to process and substance. "Of
course, discretion.., is an integral element of the litigation
process .... Such discretion is necessary if trial judges are to
manage the litigation before them effectively."'39 Neverthe-
less, discretion which is too broad can cause unfortunate and
avoidable differences in treatment of similarly situated people,
as well as a lack of fair notice of what is required. These prob-
lems can be avoided with the adoption of a few local court
rules. 4 ' Such local rules seem preferable to allowing a
"shakedown period" on fines, characterized as "a bell-shaped
curve of litigation activity responsive to rule change," which
helps educate the bar about what is expected of them under Rule
11 . . . . Publication can . . . [be achieved] by distribution of copies of the
order to other lawyers in the sanctioned firm.
William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 202 (1985). Recall as well that in the fall of 1990, the Chicago
Bar Association said that possible sanctions under Rule 11 should include require-
ments that law firms "institute internal approval procedures to assure that future
filings comply with the rule." Comment of Chicago Bar, supra note 67, at 12.
139. Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 1017 n.22.
140. The wisdom of the 1993 rulemakers in not promulgating a "uniform ap-
proach" to fines is not addressed herein. Evidently, they believed a single approach
was not desirable "given that the district courts vary tremendously in size, volume
of cases, calendar congestion, and types of cases, and that litigation tactics of at-
torneys may differ across the country." Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
557, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1985).
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"peaks and then declines to normality as the profession's un-
derstanding of the rule is stabilized.""' The local rules could
address both the procedural and substantive aspects of Rule 11
practice, serving to promote uniformity within the district. The
aforedescribed reporting duties," boilerplate notices of court
initiatives,' and differentiation between nonegregious and
egregious misconduct,"M as well as other matters, could all be
addressed through local rules. Experience under the 1993 rule
should prompt reformulations of the local rules over time; fur-
ther, local rules might be changed to accommodate the differ-
ences found in the federal districts or to try new approaches to
perennial problems.
6. Varying mechanisms which address frivolous litigation
papers in the federal district courts
A final problem confronting judges considering the imposi-
tion of compensatory fines on misconducting attorneys under
the 1993 rule involves the role to be assigned other remedial
mechanisms which can also address Rule 11 misconduct. The
drafters of the new rule were certainly aware of these other
mechanisms and of the difficulties they posed to trial judges
acting pursuant to the 1983 rule; but the 1993 rulemakers
failed generally to address the relationships.' In particular,
given the federal rulemakers' express approval of bar disciplin-
ary referrals as a form of Rule 11 sanction, the relationship
between fines and referrals merits some attention.
In some instances, Rule 11 misconduct should prompt (or
prompt in the alternative) referrals to traditional disciplinary
141. Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 346.
142. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
145. In fact, the federal rulemakers in 1990 welcomed "comment and sugges-
tions with respect to the relationship amongst . . . several sources of sanctions
law." Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 350. In the end, they deemed the 1993
rule inapplicable to discovery, 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 583 (Rule
11(d)), but otherwise indicated the 1993 rule would continue to operate simulta-
neously with other sanctioning authority. Id. at 592 (Advisory Committee Note to
1993 Rule 11). Their interim report, published after their 1990 call for comments,
said: "Some unification of the various rules authorizing sanctions may be desirable;
however, creation of a single rule for sanctions may not be appropriate in view of
the different situations to which they are addressed. Interim Report, supra note
25, at 1-23. For a proposal of a single rule covering all abusive conduct in litiga-
tion, see The Committee on Federal Courts, Comments on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 and Related Rules, 46 REC. AssN BAR CITY N.Y. 267, 299-302 (1991).
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agencies for consideration of legal practice restrictions. In the
past, there have been some referrals of Rule 11 misconduct to
these agencies. When referrals have been made, the recipients
have usually been state disciplinary agencies, not the disciplin-
ary panels established within the federal courts; 4 ' this seems
a bit odd given the significant federal interest in civil litigation
misconduct in federal courts that is often defined by standards
quite different than those governing civil practice in the state
courts. Further, a few federal judges have acted under the 1983
rule as their own trial court's disciplinarian by seeking to sus-
pend from practice,'47 or otherwise to restrict the practice op-
portunities of,' misconducting attorneys without referrals
either to their own court's disciplinary process or to the rele-
vant state disciplinary agency. In many ways, such vigilante
discipline is comparable to the assessment of punitive fines
under Rule 11. As contrasted with compensatory fines which
primarily seek both to compensate and to deter and which can
address less than very egregious misbehavior, punitive fines,
like legal practice restrictions, are essentially concerned with
deterrence and with very egregious misconduct.
Of course, at least some of the problems caused by these
referral differences and by vigilante discipline could be alleviat-
ed with the establishment of "uniform federal rules of federal
litigation conduct backed up by uniform federal enforcement
146. See, e.g., Greenfield v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 118,
128-29 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (referring to state agency, though court notes local federal
rules on professional conduct may have been violated). On occasion, referrals are
made by appellate courts when Rule 11 misconduct at the trial level persists in
the same case on appeal. See, e.g., Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985); see also Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 676 F. Supp.
823, 831 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (referring attorney to both the state and the federal
trial court disciplinary bodies in civil contempt proceeding arising out of attempts
to enforce earlier Rule 11 monetary sanctions), and vacated on other grounds, 687
F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
147. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(issuing "show cause" order on suspension from legal practice); cf. Piazza v. Carson
City, 652 F. Supp. 1394, 1395 (D. Nev. 1987) (holding that 1983 rule does not
contemplate disbarment as an appropriate sanction).
148. See, e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 137 F.R.D. 646, 656 n.9, 657 (N.D. Tex.
1991) (removing attorney from case, but not suspending him from practicing law in
the district); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 660 (E.D.N.C. 1989)
(prohibiting attorneys from practicing in the trial court until Rule 11 monetary
sanctions are paid), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d
505, 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); American Auto. Ass'n
v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (placing name of attorney in
special file).
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mechanisms." 9 Further discussion is needed on the interface
between a federal trial court's disciplinary power, a state disci-
plinary agency's authority and the power of a single federal
judge to impose fines and other public interest remedies for
conduct violating Rule 11.50
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1993 amendments to Federal Civil Rule 11 invite
fewer private interest sanctions, such as attorneys' fee awards,
and more public interest sanctions, such as fines payable to the
court. This move raises difficult procedural and substantive
questions. To a large extent, these questions cannot be an-
swered by examining the legislative history of the 1993 rule or
the fines imposed under earlier versions of the rule. New guide-
lines for fines payable to the court are needed. Such guidelines
should distinguish between compensatory and punitive fines
and be integrated with other public interest sanctions such as
bar disciplinary referrals. In many ways, the 1993 rule pres-
ents some new forms of the "stop-and-think" standard; it focus-
es on stopping and thinking by lawyers after papers have been
presented, not before, and focuses on stopping and thinking by
law firms about the relationships, if any, between their inter-
nal practices and any frivolous papers presented by them to
federal courts. Debate on the new Rule 11 should begin soon so
that the surge in fines paid to federal district courts after De-
cember 1993 is handled fairly and efficiently.
149. Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging
Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHNI URB. L.J. 969, 977 (1992). Prob-
lems could also be reduced with the creation of a "national bar." Id. at 974.
150. See, e.g., Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 550 (4th
Cir. 1990) (where "an attorney's conduct does not threaten the orderly administra-
tion of justice in the courtroom," trial court should refer the attorney to the disci-
plinary mechanism established by local court rule), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580
(1991).
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